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THE INDIANA DEATH PENALTY: AN
EXERCISE IN CONSTITUTIONAL FUTILITY
INTRODUCTION
The death penalty is one of the few areas of law about which
almost everyone entertains some sort of an opinion. Debates on the
death penalty inevitably end up with strong emphasis upon moral,
religious, and political arguments.' Nonetheless, the premise of this
note is not the moral or ethical issues of capital punishment, but
rather the legal and constitutional.
Significantly, the major death penalty cases to be discussed
have all occurred in the last thirteen years! In this litigation,
various constitutional theories have been advanced. In considering
the constitutional validity of the Indiana death penalty, several fun-
damental issues must therefore be resolved.
The first, and perhaps most significant case to be recently
decided by the United States Supreme Court was handed down in
1968. In United States v. Jackson,3 the Court held that the relevant
death penalty statute operated to needlessly burden a defendant's
fifth amendment' right not to plead guilty, and his sixth amendment5
1. See generally, H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: AN AN-
THOLOGY (2d ed. 1968); W. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA: RECENT RESEARCH ON
DISCRIMINATION AND DETERRENCE IN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1974); I. ISENBERG, THE
DEATH PENALTY (1977); G. GOTTLIEB, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1967); F. BRESLER,
REPRIEVE: A STUDY OF A SYSTEM (1965); G. MCCLELLAN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1961).
2. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT (1979). These particular commentators suggest that the significant
developments of recent constitutional theory are more attributable to the personalities
of the members of the Court, rather than any logical extension of legal thought and
analysis. It is more likely a combination of both factors.
Nevertheless, one can discern an evolution of constitutional thought beginning
with the Warren Court's treatment of the death penalty in United States v. Jackson,
see notes 3 and 149-57 infra and accompanying text, and continuing through the
Burger Court's contribution of the 1970's. Only time will tell what constitutional
developments will occur in the future.
3. 390 U.S 570 (1968).
4. The amendment reads in pertinent part: "No person ... shall be compel-
led in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .... U U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. The amendment reads in full:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previous-
ly ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
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right to a jury trial. The Court therefore struck down the death
penalty in Jackson under a penumbra of fundamental rights theory.
For the next three years the Supreme Court was silent on the
death penalty issue. In 1971, however, the Court in McGautha v.
California" upheld a statute which allowed a judge or jury complete
discretion on whether to impose a death sentence. The petitioner in
McGautha unsuccessfully argued that discretionary death penalty
statutes violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.'
Only a year later came the landmark decision of Furman v.
Georgia.8 The discretionary death penalty statute under review in
Furman was almost identical to the statute involved in McGautha.
But the controlling aspect of Furman, at least in the view of five
justices, was that discretionary statutes permitted the arbitrary ap-
plication of the death penalty and therefore violated the eighth
amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.9
Thus, the sole distinguishing factor between McGautha and Furman
was that the former asserted an unsuccessful due process claim
while the latter found protection under the eighth amendment. As
will be seen, subsequent death penalty cases utilize both constitu-
tional theories.
From Furman in 1972 until the present, the death penalty as a
constitutional penal sanction has continued to be of questionable
validity. Although the Court dealt only with the statutes of
Georgia ° and Texas," the practical effect and almost universal inter-
accusation; to be confronted with witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
7. The amendment reads in pertinent part: "No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; . . ." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
8. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (5-4 per curiam decision with all justices filing separate
opinions).
9. The amendment reads in full: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
10. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 239 (Furman convicted of murder in
Georgia and sentenced to death). In a consolidated case, Lucious Jackson, Jr. was con-
victed of rape in Georgia and sentenced to death.
11. Id. Elmer Branch was convicted and sentenced to death for the crime of
rape in Texas. This case was also consolidated with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972).
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pretation of Furman was nothing short of total invalidation of all
death penalty statutes then in existence."2 Thus, in the intervening
years the states have engaged in legislative experimentation. The
goal was to interpret the directives of the nine separate opinions of
Furman,"3 and implement a death penalty statute that corrected the
corresponding defects.
This task was not so easy. In the post-Furman litigation of
1976, the Court upheld under the eighth and fourteenth amendments
the constitutionality of the death penalty of Florida,"' Georgia, 5 and
Texas; and held constitutionally infirm the statutes of North
Carolina" and Louisiana. 8 Still later, the Supreme Court struck
down the Ohio death penalty as defective under the eighth and four-
teenth amendments. 19 Thus the validity of capital punishment as im-
posed by any particular state is far from a settled constitutional
issue.'
Indiana has endured a rather typical experience in its attempt
to enact a valid death penalty statute. As did the courts of most
states, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the pre-Furman Indiana
12. More than 120 capital punishment cases then pending before the Supreme
Court were remanded in light of Furman and its companion cases of Stewart v.
Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845 (1972), and Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972). See
Memorandum Decisions, 408 U.S. 932-41 (1972).
13. 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); i& at 257 (Brennan, J., concurr-
ing); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring); id at 314
(Marshall, J., concurring); id at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id at 405 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); id at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting); id at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
14. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
15. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
16. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
17. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
18. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
19. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978). For
text of eighth and fourteenth amendments, see notes 7 and 9 supra.
20. The exceptions are, of course, Florida, Georgia, and Texas. See notes
14-16 supra and accompanying text. With the execution of Gary Mark Gilmore on
January 17, 1977, one would think that Utah has a constitutionally valid death penalty.
The Utah statute, however, has never been scrutinized. In Gilmore's case, the Court
has only ruled that a defendant can voluntarily and intelligently waive his right to
challenge the constitutionality of a death sentence. The Court has also ruled that no
one but the defendant has standing to challenge a death sentence. See Gilmore v.
Utah, 429 U.S. 1056 (1977) (affd mem., denied standing for the Latter-Day Saint
Freedom Foundation); and Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (per curiam) (denied
standing for defendant's mother) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting, on the ground
that a defendant cannot voluntarily be executed under a possibly unconstitutional
statute).
19811
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death penalty as in compliance with all state and federal constitu-
tional requirements. 1 The Furman decision, however, forced the
state supreme court to reconsider and, consequently, the Indiana
death penalty was invalidated.'
The Indiana legislature quickly responded with enactment of a
mandatory death penalty.' This mandatory statute was thought to
have corrected the eighth amendment-Furman defect of unguided
sentencing discretion. The United States Supreme Court subse-
quently held to the contrary in Woodson v. North Carolina"' and
Roberts v. Louisiana.25 As a result, the state supreme court in-
validated the Indiana mandatory death penalty statute. 26
The Indiana legislature again responded to the challenge and
adopted a death penalty statute 7 modeled after the statutes upheld
in the Furman progeny of Gregg v. Georgia,2 Proffitt v. Florida,2
and Jurek v. Texas2 The Indiana statute, however, is not identical
to any of the statutes then under review by the Supreme Court. In
fact, there exist two critical deficiencies in the Indiana death pen-
alty statute.
The first and foremost defect is that the statutory scheme
grants to individual prosecuting attorneys an unconstitutional
degree of discretion. The statutory scheme therefore permits an In-
diana prosecutor to exert impermissible burdens upon a defendant's
fifth amendment right not to plead guilty, and his sixth amendment
right to a jury trial. In other words, the Indiana statute contains a
Jackson defect. 1
The second infirmity of the statute is its failure to provide
meaningful appellate review of the death sentences actually imposed
in Indiana trial courts. This deficiency of the Indiana statutory
scheme centers on the eighth and fourteenth amendment issues
derived from Furman and its progeny.
21. Adams v. State, 259 Ind. 64, 271 N.E.2d 425 (1971).
22. Adams v. State, 259 Ind. 164, 284 N.E.2d 757 (1972).
23. 1973 Ind. Acts, Pub. L. No. 328, § 1 (repealed 1976).
24. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
25. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
26. French v. State, 266 Ind. 276, 362 N.E.2d 834 (1977).
27. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (Supp. 1979).
28. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
29. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
30. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
31. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). See notes 149-77 infra and accompanying text.
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Considered separately, each of these defects provides ample
basis for holding the statutory scheme unconstitutional. Considered
together, the practical effect of the statutory scheme, "rather than
resulting in the selection of 'extreme' cases for [the] punishment [of
death], actually sanction(s) an arbitrary selection. . . In other
words, our procedure [is] not constructed to guard against the totally
capricious selection of criminals for the punishment of death.""2
The purpose of this note is to point out the two major stat-
utory defects of the Indiana death sentence: prosecutorial discre-
tion and standardless appellate review. To achieve this, it is neces-
sary to analyze the major death penalty cases of recent years.' It is
also essential to compare the Indiana statute with other statutory
schemes; more particularly, the Indiana death penalty as compared
to the statutes upheld and those struck down by the Supreme
Court. Finally, recommendations will be made as to how to correct
the defects inherent in the statutory scheme of the Indiana death
penalty.
FURMAN AND THE STATES' RESPONSE
The eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment applies to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment." The United States Supreme Court, however, has never pre-
cisely defined what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.' In-
32. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring).
03. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 153
(1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968). The purpose of this note is an analysis of the constitutionality of the Indiana
death penalty, and not an evolutionary analysis of constitutional thought concerning
capital punishment. Therefore, the cases cited above will not be considered in
chronological order. For example, Jackson is a major case decided in 1968, but it will
be the last case discussed. See notes 149-77 infra and accompanying text. Although an
evolutionary analysis would be insightful, it does not comport with the format of this
note.
34. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Compare Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweler, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (in which it was assumed, but not specifically
stated by eight justices that the eighth amendment applied to the states) with In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (in which Chief Justice Fuller states for the Court: "It is
not contended, as it could not be, that the eighth amendment was intended to apply to
the states .... Id. at 446).
35. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulies, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), in which Chief Justice Warren
stated for the majority that "[tihe exact scope of the constitutional phrase 'cruel and
unusual' has not been detailed by this Court." Id. at 99.
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deed, until Furman, the Supreme Court had adjudged only three
punishments to be in violation of the eighth amendment
prohibition. 6 Of these three instances, the most succinct test ad-
vanced by the Court was to apply "evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."37 But this vague stan-
dard proved unworkable, and only two of the concurring justices in
Furman utilized it in holding the death sentence unconstitutional.'
Significantly, both of these justices were the only members of the
Court to conclude that the substantive nature and the historically
arbitrary application of the death penalty made it unconstitutional
in all circumstances. Moreover, both justices have consistantly held
this position throughout post-Furman litigation."
The opinions of the remaining three concurring justices did not
extend so far as to invoke an analysis of the contemporary stand-
ards of decency. Rather, Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White looked
to the procedures utilized by the states in their respective applica-
tions of death sentences." The controlling opinions objected to the
unbridled discretion of judges and juries to inflict death as a penal
36. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (sentence of fifteen years
at hard labor and to be restrained for the duration by chains for the crime of falsifying
a public record constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958) (expatriation for wartime desertion constituted cruel punishment); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (imprisonment for narcotic addiction was cruel and
unusual). See also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (Court held 5-4 that life
sentence under habitual offender act was not cruel and unusual punishment for three
unrelated convictions totaling $229.11).
37. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101. It is important to note that an "evolving
standard of decency" analysis involves four corollaries: First, there are certain
punishments that a civilized citizenry does not tolerate because of the physical pain in-
volved, e.g., burning at the stake or public dissection, O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323
(1892); second, a punishment that was simply unknown prior to the adoption of the Bill
of Rights should be construed as unusual, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 332 (Marshall,
J., concurring) (dicta); third, an excessive punishment that serves no valid legislative
purpose, Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), see also note 36 supra; and final-
ly, a punishment that public sentiment condemns even though it is not excessive and it
serves a valid legislative purpose, see, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 332 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring) (dicta).
38. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314
(Marshall, J., concurring). Significantly, the dissenting justices, Blackmun, Burger,
Powell, and Rehnquist, applied the "evolving standards of decency" test and arrived at
the opposite conclusion, i.e., that the death penalty is a constitutional punishment, and
that it was constitutional as imposed in Furman.
39. See, e.g., dissents of Brennan and Marshall in Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S.
807, rehearing den., 444 U.S. 1301 (1979); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1056 (1977);
Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
40. See note 13 supra.
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sanction, rather than a substantive objection to death as a punish-
ment. What the swing justices found cruel and unusual, was not the
nature of capital punishment, but the capricious and discriminatory
application of the penalty."
The controlling opinions were essentially derived from a pro-
cedural analysis of sentencing systems. Nevertheless, in the separ-
ate concurring opinions one is hard pressed to find any practical
suggestions as to how a state could permissably inflict death as a
criminal punishment.'" A fairly accurate conclusion, however, is that
to satisfy the eighth amendment the states must develop limits on
discretion which assure that death sentences are not imposed ar-
bitrarily.'
Although Furman settled very little constitutional doctrine, the
import of the decision was the plurality's condemnation of the ca-
pricious and discriminatory application of capital punishment.
Sentencing discretion in the trial court, by judge or jury, was per-
ceived as the evil to be eliminated. Thus it was interpreted by state
legislatures that there were three avenues of response." First, the
states could simply abolish capital punishment.'5 Secondly, sentenc-
ing discretion could be completely eliminated through the enactment
of mandatory death penalty statutes: that is, upon conviction an
automatic sentence of death is imposed."
The third alternative was the adoption of a statutory scheme
with guidelines intended to structure and reduce sentencing discre-
41. Tao, Beyond Furman v. Georgia: The Need for a Morally Based Decision
on Capital Punishment, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 722 (1976).
42. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 257, where Justice Douglas con-
cludes his opinion by stating that "[wjhether a mandatory death penalty would other-
wise be constitutional is a question I do not reach." See also id. at 310, in which
Justice Stewart states: "I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that
permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed." See also id.
at 314, Justice White stating: "In my judgement what was done in these cases violated
the Eighth Amendment."
43. Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty
Statute, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1690 (1974).
44. England, Capital Punishment in the Light of Constitutional Evolution: An
Analysis of Distinctions Between Furman and Gregg, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 596 (1977).
45. Id. Significantly, none of the states followed this route. Nine states had
abolished capital punishment before Furman. These states were: Alabama in 1957;
Hawaii in 1957; Iowa, 1965; Maine, 1887; Michigan, 1847; Minnesota, 1911; Oregon,
1964; West Virginia, 1965; and Wisconsin, 1853.
46. Indiana chose this route. See 1973 Ind. Acts, Pub. L. No. 328, § 1 (re-
pealed 1976).
1981]
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tion." Basically the guidelines consist of a legislatively defined list
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances weighed against each
other. Death may be imposed if the conclusion of the sentencing
authority is that the aggravating circumstances outweigh any miti-
gating circumstances.
The states that adopted mandatory death penalty schemes
merely repeated history. Mandatory death sentences were common
practice amongst the states at the time the eighth amendment was
adopted in 1791.48 Death was the automatic punishment for crimes
such as murder, rape, robbery, burglary, and sodomy."9 Yet, in con-
sideration of circumstances of the offense and characteristics of the
defendant, many juries revolted against such harsh penal sanctions
by a refusal to convict.60 Gradually the states responded by first nar-
rowing the category of crimes to which death was a mandatory
punishment. Finally, by 1963 all of the states had replaced man-
datory death statutes with discretionary schemes." Indiana replaced
its mandatory death penalty with a discretionary statutory scheme
in 1941."2
The Supreme Court has on several occasions commented
favorably on this trend by the states to abandon mandatory death
statutes. As early as 1899, the Court stated that the "hardship of
punishing with death every crime coming within the definition of
murder at common law, and the reluctance of jurors to concur in a
capital conviction, have induced American legislatures, in modern
times, to allow some cases of murder to be punished by imprison-
ment, instead of by death."' Still later, the Court noted that "[tihis
whole country has traveled far from the period in which the death sen-
tence was an automatic and commonplace result of convictions.... "'
Dissenting in Furman, Chief Justice Burger foresaw the
possibility that the states may return once again to mandatory
death sentences. The Chief Justice even warned "that mandatory
47. See notes 80-82 infra and accompanying text.
48. See H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: AN ANTHOLOGY 5-6, 15,
27-28 (2d ed. 1968).
49. Id. at 6.
50. Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment. An Historical
Note, 54 BUFFALO L. REV. 32 (1974). See generally Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discre-
tion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1099 (1953).
51. W. BROWN, EXECUTION IN AMERICA 7-9 (1974).
52. Id.
53. Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303, 310 (1899).
54. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
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sentences of death, without the intervening and ameliorating impact
of lay jurors, are so arbitrary and doctrinaire that they violated the
Constitution."' Moreover, taking Furman as a whole, six justices,'
while one reserved judgment, 7 indicated a belief that mandatory
death sentences were unconstitutional. Yet in light of essentially
clear and unambiguous dicta, and its own historical experience, the
Indiana legislature adopted a mandatory death sentence.,
The Indiana Response to Furman
Indiana's legislative response to Furman was the adoption of
the second available alternative: a mandatory death sentence. The
statute provided that "[wihoever perpetrates any of the [designated]
acts is guilty of murder in the first degree and, on conviction, shall
be put to death.""9 The acts designated to trigger an automatic
death sentence were: 1) the killing of a police officer, corrections
employee, or fireman acting in the line of duty; 2) killing by ex-
plosives; 3) killing while committing or attempting to commit rape,
arson, robbery or burglary by a defendant who had a prior
unrelated conviction of one of these felonies; 4) killing during the
course of a kidnapping; 5) killing during the course of a hijacking of
an airplane, bus, train, ship, or other commercial vehicle; 6) killing
by a defendant lying in wait, hired to kill, or who had been serving a
life sentence or who had a previous conviction for murder." Thus,
the Indiana legislature classified certain acts and certain
characteristics of the defendant as so inherently dangerous and
socially undesirable as to warrant, upon conviction, an automatic
sentence of death. The statute provided for neither the considera-
tion of any mitigating circumstances surrounding the crime, nor the
recognition of any socially redeeming characteristics of an individual
offender. By leaving no room for mercy, this statutory scheme was
55. 408 U.S. at 402 (Burger, C.J., Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ.,
dissenting). The Chief Justice warned: "If [a mandatory death sentence] is the only
alternative that the legislatures can safely pursue under today's ruling, I would have
preferred that the Court opt for total abolition." Id. at 401.
56. 408 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring); id. at 401 (Burger, C.J., Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); id. at
414 (Powell, J., dissenting).
57. 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring). See note 42 supra.
58. 1973 Ind. Acts, Pub. L. No. 328, § 1 (repealed 1976).
59. Id. § 1(b).
60. Id. These acts by the defendant that triggered an automatic sentence of
death essentially became the designated aggravating circumstances listed in the cur-
rent statute. See IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (Supp. 1980), note 107 infra.
1981]
Chipman: The Indiana Death Penalty: An Exercis in Constitutional Futility
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981
418 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 15
thought to correct the Furman evil of unbridled sentencing discre-
tion.
The mandatory death sentence scheme adopted by Indiana was
soon put to rest. In Woodson v. North Carolina"' and Roberts v.
Louisiana," the United States Supreme Court struck down as
violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments mandatory death
sentences imposed under schemes similar to the one adopted in In-
diana." In those cases, North Carolina and Louisiana argued that the
eighth amendment-Furman evil of unchecked sentencing discretion
was corrected by total elimination of all sentencing discretion. The
plurality" rejected this argument by invoking contemporary stand-
ards of decency to "assure that the states' power to punish is 'exer-
cised within the limits of civilized standards'.""
Through its analysis, the plurality looked toward society's
historical aversion to automatic sentences of death." The return to
mandatory death sentences, which both states had rejected long
ago, 7 led the majority to conclude that the eighth amendment "simply
cannot tolerate the reintroduction of a practice so thoroughly
discredited."" Therefore, North Carolina and Louisiana departed
markedly from contemporary standards of decency, and mandatory
death sentences were ruled to be within the prohibition of the
eighth amendment." In French v. State,0 the Indiana Supreme
61. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
62. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
63. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 285 n.4; Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. at 329 n.3.
64. In both Woodson and Roberts, the opinion of Justice Stewart, joined by
Justices Powell and Stevens, delineated the plurality's analysis. Justices Brennan and
Marshall concurred but stood by their original position in Furman that capital punish-
ment was unconstitutional under all circumstances.
65. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 288.
66. See notes 48-56 supra and accompanying text.
67. North Carolina rejected its then existing mandatory death sentence in
1949 by adopting a discretionary scheme. Louisiana rejected mandatory death
sentences in 1846. Compare Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 300, and Roberts
v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 336, with 1973 Ind. Acts, Pub. L. No. 328, § 1 (repealed 1976).
68. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 326.
69. In Woodson, the plurality noted that a possible exception was the man-
datory infliction of death upon a life-term prisoner who subsequently committed
murder. In Roberts, the plurality again noted that a murder committed by a prisoner
serving a life sentence presented a unique problem that might justify a mandatory
death sentence statute. The Court has not yet had the opportunity to rule on this
question.
70. 266 Ind. 276, 362 N.E.2d 834 (1977).
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Court followed suit and accordingly struck down the Indiana man-
datory death sentence.
To summarize, Furman v. Georgia7 struck down the death
penalty statutes then under review on the ground that there existed
too much sentencing discretion. Woodson v. North Carolinam and
Roberts v. Louisiana"5 invalidated mandatory death sentences on the
ground that such statutory schemes eliminated too much sentencing
discretion. Thus, the Court had drawn the lines: too much discretion
in the hands of sentencing authorities was impermissible, and not
enough discretion was equally impermissible. Moreover, the Jackson
Court ruled that statutory schemes could not be structured so as to
place impermissible burdens upon a defendant's fifth and sixth
amendment rights.7"
Still, the Court had not provided any clear guidelines as to how
a state could constitutionally impose a sentence of death. The
guiding principle was simply that "in capital cases the fundamental
respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires
consideration of the character and record of the individual offender
and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally
indispensible part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."75
Hence, the third alternative, that is, a death penalty with standards
to guide and regularize the penalty decision was the next logical
71. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See notes 34-58 supra and accompanying text. Furman
struck down discretionary death penalty statutes under the eighth amendment.
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), upheld an almost identical statute under a
due process challenge under the fourteenth amendment. But another distinguishing
factor of McGautha was that it involved a unitary trial procedure. The petitioner al-
leged that such a procedure put him in the irreconcilable position of either in-
criminating himself during the trial, or waiving his opportunity to submit evidence of
mitigating circumstances in an attempt to avoid a death sentence. Otherwise,
McGautha and Furman are indistinguishable. But see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at
196 n.47: "McGautha was not an Eighth Amendment decision, and to the extent it pur-
ported to deal with Eighth Amendment concerns, it must be read in light of the opin-
ions in Furman v. Georgia. While Furman did not overrule McGautha, it is clearly in
substantial tension with a broad reading of McGautha's holding." See also Comment,
Resurrection of Capital Punishment-The 1976 Death Penalty Cases, 81 DICK. L. REV.
543 (1977), in which the writer suggests that the failure of the Furman Court to over-
rule McGautha, a case decided the previous year, was due to the Court's traditional
allegiance to the doctrine of stare decisis.
72. See notes 61-69 supra and accompanying text.
73. See notes 62-69 supra and accompanying text.
74. See notes 3-5 supra and notes 148-76 infra and accompanying text. The
fifth and sixth amendments are quoted in notes 4 and 5 supra.
75. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 304.
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step for Indiana, 6 as well as all other jurisdictions that sought the
retention of capital punishment.
Supreme Court Upholds Death Penalty Statutes with Guidelines
On the same day of the Roberts and Woodson decisions, the
Supreme Court upheld the statutory schemes of Georgia," Florida,"8
and Texas.79 In those cases, the death penalty statutes were quite
similar.
Texas had narrowed the category of murders for which the
death penalty was an available sentencing option." The Florida"1 and
Georgia 2 schemes provided for a determination based on aggra-
vating or mitigating circumstances. In those states, if the sentencing
authority finds the existence of an enumerated aggravating cir-
cumstance, it is then required to weigh against that circumstance,
any mitigating circumstances brought out in the penalty phase of
the trial. As in Texas, the Florida and Georgia schemes provide
death as an available sentencing option if upon the specific finding
of the sentencing authority the existence of any aggravating cir-
cumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Thus, although
the schemes of Georgia and Florida are essentially different from
that of Texas, each serves much the same purpose in that all three
statutes require the "sentencing authority to focus on the par-
ticularized nature of the crime.""
The Court also favorably emphasized that the death penalty
statutes of all three states held two other aspects in common. First,
each state made provisions for a bifurcated trial." That is, the
statutes require two phases of a trial: a guilt phase and a penalty
phase. In the guilt phase, the only matter to be considered by the
jury is the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The defendant is ac-
corded all constitutional protections: the most important of which is
his fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination."
76. See notes 80-82 and 107 infra.
77. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
78. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
79. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
80. Id. at 265 n.1. The current law in Texas is substantially similar. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 19.03 (Vernon 1974).
81. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 248 n.6.
82. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 165 n.9.
83. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 271.
84. See notes 80-82 supra.
85. See note 4 supra. See also note 71 supra.
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Upon a finding of guilt, the court reconvenes for the penalty
phase. At this stage all information relevant to punishment is ad-
missible. Thus, among other things, a defendant can now take the
stand and offer evidence of mitigating circumstances. Through this
tactic the defendant necessarily implies his guilt of the original
charge and, of course, he is eventually subjected to cross-
examination. Therefore, a bifurcated proceeding allows a defendant
to fully utilize his fifth amendment right to not incriminate himself
during the guilt phase, and yet it further allows him to submit dur-
ing the penalty phase mitigating evidence in an attempt to avoid a
death sentence.
A bifurcated proceeding therefore allows the trial court to ad-
mit important information relevant to the aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances of the particular offense." After all evidence has
been admitted, the jury deliberates on the sole issue of punishment.
During deliberation, the sentencing authority is referred to the
guidance provided by statute."' If a sentence of death is subse-
quently handed down, it is presumably based upon a rationally guided
decision.
The second common denominator of the death penalty schemes
adopted by Georgia, Texas, and Florida involved the appeals pro-
cess. All three statutes provide for automatic and expedient appeal
86. In the penalty phase, all three states relax the rules of evidence. That is,
all evidence relevant to the penalty to be imposed is admissible. Compare GA. CODE
ANN. § 27-2501(a) (1978) with 1970 Ga. Laws, at 949, 950, as amended by 1971 Ga.
Laws, at 902; 1973 Ga. Laws, at 159, 161 (current version deletes: "subject to the laws
of evidence"). See also Brown v. State, 235 Ga. 644, -, 220 S.E.2d 922, 925-26 (1975).
87. Sentencing authority refers to the entity that has the authority to
ultimately determine the sentence to be imposed.
In Florida, the jury assumes an advisory role. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)
(West Supp. 1980). The trial judge is not required to follow the jury's recommendation,
provided that if the judge decides to impose death, he or she must submit a written
justification for the decision. Id. § (3). Thus, the judge is the sentencing authority.
In Georgia, the jury deliberates to essentially determine the sentence. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-3102 (1978). If the jury recommends death, the trial court is required
to impose a death sentence. Id. If a case is tried before the court, the trial judge is re-
quired to utilize the same guidelines as would a jury. Id.
A Texas jury assumes a role similar to that in Georgia. In Texas, a jury must
answer in the affirmative three specific questions. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1980). See also note 101 infra and accompanying text. For death
to be imposed, the jury must unanimously answer 'yes' to all three questions. Id. § (d).
If the jury answers 'no' to any of the three questions, then a sentence of life imprison-
ment is imposed. Id. § (e). Moreover, the jury can answer 'no' only if ten of twelve
members agree. Id. It is unclear what happens if the jury cannot agree on an answer
to the questions.
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to the respective supreme courts." At this point, however, the pro-
cedures of review provided in each state diverge and take on dif-
ferent shapes. Nevertheless, the end result is construed by the
Supreme Court to amount to meaningful appellate review.
The Georgia statute requires the state supreme court to re-
spond to three areas of concern. First, the court is to determine
whether the death sentence was "imposed under the influence of
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. .. "" Secondly, the
court must find the aggravating circumstance is supported by the
evidence." Finally, the Georgia Supreme Court must decide whether
the death sentence is "excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defend-
ant. ..."'
The Georgia court is required to consider several sources of in-
formation. Relevant information is derived from the trial court re-
cord and a detailed questionnaire submitted by the trial judge." Fur-
thermore, statistics are derived from comparative data accumulated
specifically by the newly created post of assistant to the supreme
court." Moreover, in its decision to affirm a death sentence the
Georgia Supreme Court is required to make reference to similar
cases it had recently considered.'
Utilizing these legislatively established appellate review pro-
cedures, the Georgia Supreme Court has on several occasions set
aside death sentences. The most prevalent reason to vacate a death
sentence was because it was excessive or disproportionate in com-
parison to sentences imposed in a significant number of factually
similar cases.95 In considering all of these procedures, the United
States'Supreme Court concluded that Georgia now provides "the
further safeguard of meaningful appellate review [to] ensure that
88. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537 (1978); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(f)
(Vernon Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4) (West Supp. 1980).
89. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 204. See also GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(cXl)
(1978).
90. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(c)(2) (1978).
91. Id. § (c)(3).
92. Id. § (a).
93. Id. §§ (f)-(h).
94. Id. § (e).
95. See, e.g., Dorsey v. State, 236 Ga. 591, 225 S.E.2d 418 (1976); Jarrell v.
State, 234 Ga. 410, 216 S.E.2d 258 (1975); Moore v. State, 233 Ga. 861, 213 S.E.2d 829
(1975); Floyd v. State, 233 Ga. 280, 210 S.E.2d 810 (1974); Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829,
204 S.E.2d 612 (1974).
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death sentences are not imposed capriciously or in a freakish man-
ner."
96
In contrast, Florida" and Texas98 did not incorporate as com-
prehensive an appellate review process as did Georgia.99 However,
the Court emphasized that the statutes of both Florida and Texas
require the respective sentencing authorities to submit into the trial
record written findings of fact concerning the existence of aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances.
In Florida, if death is imposed as a sanction, the trial judge
must make a written justification for his decision.' °9 In Texas, the jury
must unanimously answer in the affirmative three questions: 1)
whether the defendant intended to kill the victim; 2) whether there
is a probability that the defendant would act violently in the future;
and 3) whether the defendant's conduct was an unreasonable
response to any provocation by the victim.'9 ' The Court noted that
the appellate courts of both Florida' °2 and Texas' 3 have therefore
properly assumed their role as an independent judge of the ap-
propriateness of a particular death sentence, and as the ultimate
supervisor over its administration.' 4
In summary, a majority of the Court explicitly held for the first
time that capital punishment is not cruel and unusual per se. How-
96. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 195.
97. See note 81 supra.
98. See note 80 supra.
99. See notes 87-96 supra and accompanying text.
100. See note 87 supra.
- 101. Id. But see Black, Due Process for Death: Jurek v. Texas and Companion
Cases, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 1 (1976). The writer argues that the first question answered
by the jury inquires about the actual holding that the defendant had committed first
degree murder. The third question concerning the element of mental reflection by the
defendant has already been answered in the negative by the jury with its finding of
first degree murder, instead of murder without malice or manslaughter. Thus, the sec-
ond question is the only one about which the jury decides matters it had not already
considered. The author also suggests that appellate review in Texas, unlike the review
in Florida and Georgia, merely consists of an ordinary search for error. Id.
102. See, e.g., Messer v. State, 330 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1976); Thompson v. State,
328 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1976).
103. See, e.g., Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
104. See Rockwell v. Ventura Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 556 P.2d 1101,
134 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1976). See also Palmer, Two Perspectives on Structuring Discre-
tion: Justices Stewart and White on the Death Penalty, 70 J. CRIM. L. & C. 194 (1979)
(majority finally adopted Stewart's view that in death penalty cases, appellate courts
must occupy a policy'making and supervisory role); England, note 44 supra ("the
judicial obligation of supervision was adopted in Gregg v. Georgia").
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ever, the eighth and fourteenth amendments can only tolerate
death penalty statutory schemes that direct the sentencing author-
ity's attention to the circumstances of the offense and the particular
characteristics of the offender. This goal must be achieved by lend-
ing specific guidance and direction to the sentencing authority's
discretion by the utilization of statutorily defined guidelines or, by
narrowing the categories of murder to which the death penalty may
be applied. Moreover, to be valid, a statute must provide as an avail-
able alternative a sentence less severe than that of death.
The Court did not require but did endorse a bifurcated pro-
ceeding in which the penalty to be applied is considered after the
issue of guilt has been settled. Finally and most importantly, the
Court placed great emphasis on the procedures adopted by state
courts to ensure meaningful appellate review over the infliction of
the ultimate penalty. As will be seen in later decisions,"'5 the em-
phasis placed by the Court upon meaningful appellate review subse-
quently achieves constitutional significance through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
THE INDIANA LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
The Indiana legislature quickly drew the valid conclusions
enunciated in the Furman progeny."° Enactment of the current In-
diana death penalty statute occurred in 1977."07 Although the statute
105. See note 118 infra.
106. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976); and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
107. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (Supp. 1980):
(a) The state may seek a death sentence for murder by alleging, on a page
separate from the rest of the charging instrument, the existence of at least
one (1) of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (b) of this sec-
tion. In the sentencing hearing after a person is convicted of murder, the
state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one (1)
of the aggravating circumstances alleged.
(b) The aggravating circumstances are as follows:
(1) The defendant committed the murder by intentionally kill-
ing the victim while committing or attempting to commit ar-
son, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct, kid-
napping, rape, or robbery.
(2) The defendant committed the murder by the unlawful
detonation of an explosive with intent to injure person or
damage property.
(3) The defendant committed the murder by lying in wait.
(4) The defendant who committed the murder was hired to
kill.
(5) The defendant committed the murder by hiring another
person to kill.
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(6) The victim of the murder was a corrections employee,
fireman, judge, or law enforcement officer, and either (i) the
victim was acting in the course of duty or (ii) the murder was
motivated by an act the victim performed while *acting in the
course of duty.
(7) The defendant has been convicted of another murder.
(8) The defendant has committed another murder, at any
time, regardless of whether he has been convicted of that
other murder.
(9) The defendant was under a sentence of life imprisonment
at the time of the murder.
(c) The mitigating circumstances that may be considered under this section
are as follows:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal
conduct.
(2) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance when he committed the murder.
(3) The victim was a participant in, or consented to, the
defendant's conduct.
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed
by another person, and the defendant's participation was
relatively minor.
(5) The defendant acted under the substantial domination of
another person.
(6) The defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease
or defect or of intoxication.
(7) Any other circumstances appropriate for consideration.
(d) If the defendant was convicted of murder in a jury trial, the jury shall
reconvene for the sentencing hearing; if the trial was to the court, or the
judgment was entered on a guilty plea, the court alone shall conduct the
sentencing hearing. The jury, or the court, may consider all the evidence in-
troduced at the trial stage of the proceedings, together with new evidence
presented at the sentencing hearing. The defendant may present any addi-
tional evidence relevant to:
(1) the aggravating circumstances alleged; or
(2) any of the mitigating circumstances listed in subsection (c)
of this section.
(e) If the hearing is by jury, the jury shall recommend to the court
whether the death penalty should be imposed. The jury may recommend the
death penalty only if it finds:
(1) that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
at least one (1) of the aggravating circumstances exists; and
(2) that any mitigating circumstances that exist are
outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or cir-
cumstances.
The court shall make the final determination of the sentence, after consider-
ing the jury's recommendation, and the sentence shall be based on the same
standards that the jury was required to consider. The court is not bound by
the jury's recommendation.
(f) If a jury is unable to agree on a sentence recommendation after
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is a hybrid of the three statutes reviewed and upheld by the United
States Supreme Court,"°8 it is essentially modeled after the Florida
statute. 1°9
A comparison of the Indiana capital punishment statute with
those of Florida, Georgia and Texas reveals important similarities,
and some rather ominous defects. The three major points held in
common by all four statutes are: 1) each lists the generally accepted
aggravating and mitigating circumstances by which the judge or
jury is directed to utilize in its consideration of the appropriate
punishment to be inflicted;"' 2) each state adopts a bifurcated pro-
ceeding in which evidence and arguments relevant to punishent
are submitted only after the issue of guilt has been settled;.' and 3)
each statute provides automatic and expedient appellate court re-
view of every death sentence imposed." 2 Thus, on its face, the In-
diana statutory scheme appears to have adopted the major provi-
sions of death penalty schemes upheld by the Supreme Court.
However, closer scrutiny reveals two major defects in the In-
diana death sentence. These flaws occur at the beginning and at the
end of the statutory scheme. Indeed, one occurs at the start of In-
diana's criminal justice system, and one occurs at the stage of final
adjudication.
The first defect is revealed in the opening sentence of the
reasonable deliberations, the court shall discharge the jury and proceed as if
the hearing had been to the court alone.
(g) If the hearing is to the court alone, the court shall sentence the defend-
ant to death only if it finds:
(1) that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
at least one (1) of the aggravating circumstances exists; and
(2) that any mitigating circumstances that exist are
outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or cir-
cumstances.
(h) A death sentence is subject to automatic review by the supreme court.
The review, which shall be heard under rules adopted by the supreme court,
shall be given priority over all other cases. The death sentence may not be
executed until the supreme court has completed its review.
108. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
109. See note 81 supra. The Florida statute in turn is substantially patterned
after the MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
110. Compare note 107 supra with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West Supp.
1980) and GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(1)-(10) (1978).
111. Compare IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9, note 107 supra with statutes cited in notes
80-82 supra.
112. Compare IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9, note 107 supra with statutes cited in note
88 supra.
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statute: "The state may seek a death sentence for murder.... 113
The second defect concerns the lack of definitive procedures
employed by the Indiana judicial system in fulfillment of its man-
dated role as supervisor over the administration of the death
sentence. It is submitted that both statutory defects are of constitu-
tional significance.
THE LACK OF MEANINGFUL APPELLATE REVIEW
The United States Supreme Court endorsed appellate review
procedures adopted by Florida,"' Georgia,"' and Texas. " 6 Through
its endorsement the Court implied that the proper role of the
judiciary in its review of death sentences is to supervise and in-
dependently ensure the uniform and even-handed application of the
penalty. 7 Moreover, this implicit mandate of judicial supervision
and independent evaluation was soon made explicit in subsequent
cases." 8 An examination of the Indiana statute reveals no such
safeguard as meaningful appellate review.
At the Trial Level
In the penalty phase of the Indiana bifurcated proceeding, the
jury is required to utilize in its deliberation the statutorily defined
list of aggravating circumstances. The jury may recommend a death
sentence only if it finds beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of
one of the aggravating circumstances alleged, and that any existing
113. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(a) note 107 supra (emphasis added).
114. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
115. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
116. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
117. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
118. Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14 (1978) (vacated death sentence because it
was imposed upon the existence of an aggravating circumstance found in the trial
record by the Georgia Supreme Court, but about which the jury neither had been in-
structed, nor had the jury specifically designated it in writing as required); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (held invalid Ohio death penalty because the listed mitigating
circumstances were not broad enough to allow the sentencing authority to consider all
relevant evidence of mitigating circumstances submitted to the jury); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (vacated death sentence for rape conviction on grounds
that death was excessive and disproportionate of a penalty considering no life was
taken by defendant); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (vacated and remanded
death sentence because trial court did not fully divulge to defense counsel, or place in-
to the record for the benefit of the Florida Supreme Court review, the contents of a
confidential presentence report) (Marshall and Brennan strongly dissented suggesting
the Florida judiciary had betrayed the trust and confidence relied upon by the plural-
ity in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976)).
1981]
Chipman: The Indiana Death Penalty: An Exercis in Constitutional Futility
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981
428 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 15
mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating cir-
cumstances. 1' Unlike the sentencing authorities of Florida 2' and
Georgia, 2 ' an Indiana jury is not required to submit a written
justification for its decision to recommend death. Unlike a Texas
jury," an Indiana jury is not required to answer three specific ques-
tions concerning the elements of the offense and the characteristics
of the offender.
Thus, upon review the Indiana Supreme Court is deprived of a
trial record that clearly and specifically states the reasoning behind
the decision to impose the death sentence. The court can never truly
be sure that the judge or jury took into consideration only the
statutorily defined aggravating circumstances rather than some
other capricious or impermissible circumstance, such as the race or
social position of the defendant. Furthermore, without the require-
ment of a written justification, the trial record will not show what
weight was given any existing mitigating circumstance and why the
aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating.
In addition, the statutes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas have an
extra safeguard in the form of an automatic commutation clause. In
those states, if the judge or jury fails to comply with the statutory
requirements of clear justification of its decision to impose death, an
119. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e)(1)-(2), note 107 supra.
120. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Indianapolis Star, March 8, 1980, at 20, col. 1. Steven Judy was con-
victed on February 2, 1980 of killing a woman and her three children. After a one-half
hour deliberation, the jury recommended a sentence of death. At a reunion of juror
members, the ex-jury foreman stated that: "Some jurors might have recommended
lengthy consecutive prison sentences for the murders .. .had not Judy taunted them
with his threats (that they may be his next victims if he did not receive the death
penalty).... I already had my mind made up, but it helped me to come across with a
vote for the death penalty. It swayed a couple of others."
The ex-jury foreman further stated: "Normally, a person who could do a thing
like that would have to be insane .... But the pictures taken by police as evidence
made us all sick. He was so proud of his hundreds of past crimes ... like he conquered
all those women and he knew all the number of the types of crimes he admitted ... so
we knew he was not ignorant of what he had done. I think he was just a damn mean
kid."
The above quotes reflect one juror's consideration of at least two mitigating cir-
cumstances, ie., IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(c)(2), note 107 supra (the defendant's mental or
emotional disturbance), and IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(c)(3), note 107 supra (defendant's abil-
ity to conform his conduct to the law). But more importantly, not one of the ag-
gravating circumstances considered by the person above comes close to an aggravating
circumstance defined or permitted by the statute.
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automatic life sentence is imposed.12 Since in Indiana the judge or
jury is not required to either submit a written justification, or to
answer specific questions, no comparable- safeguard exists.
Furthermore, in its decision to impose either imprisonment or
a death sentence, the Indiana jury occupies only an advisory role.
The trial court is not bound by the jury's sentencing recommenda-
tion.'25 Thus, it appears that a jury could, in a given case, recom-
mend a sentence of imprisonment and the trial judge could wholly
disregard the recommendation and, on his own authority impose a
sentence of death. The statute does not require the trial judge to
justify this decision.
As noted by the Supreme Court, this shortcoming of the In-
diana statute is of constitutional significance. In Woodson v. North
Carolina, the plurality stated:
A separate deficiency of North Carolina's mandatory
death sentence statute is its failure to provide a constitu-
tionally tolerable response to Furman . . . [T]here is no
way under the North Carolina law for the judiciary to
check arbitrary and capricious exercise of [the] power [to
impose the ultimate punishment] through a review of the
death sentence . . . [The North Carolina procedure,
therefore,] does not fulfill Furman's basic requirement by
replacing arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with objec-
tive standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally
reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.""6
Similarly, the Court condemned the Louisiana statute for its lack of
a procedure which "permits review to check the arbitrary exercise
of the capital jury's de facto sentencing discretion."1 Consequently,
the Court concluded that in North Carolina and Louisiana "there is
no meaningful appellate review of the jury's decision.""l
Admittedly, Indiana included within its death statute a list of
the generally accepted aggravating and mitigating circumstances.'
124. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3)(b) (West Supp. 1980); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. arts. 37.071(a), (e) (Vernon Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(c) (1978).
125. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e), note 107 supra.
126. 428 U.S. at 302-03 (separate concurring opinions of Stewart, J., joined by
Powell and Stevens, JJ.) (emphasis added).
127. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 335; see notes 61-76 supra and
accompanying text.
128. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 336.
129. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(b)(1)-(9), note 107 supra.
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The trial judge and jury are required by statute to utilize these ob-
jective standards in their consideration of the appropriate punish-
ment to be imposed. 3 ' But the statute gives no guidance as to how
these standards are to be used, or how each is to be weighed against
the other. Furthermore, the statute does not provide any procedure
as to how the trial court should record this decision-making process.
Thus, it is evident the Indiana statutory scheme neither adopts nor
requires the procedures necessary to create at the trial level a clear
and specific record upon which the state supreme court can base a
rational review. The end result is the promulgation of a decision-
making system of imposing death that provides "no meaningful basis
for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is im-
posed from the many cases in which it is not." '31 This deficiency of
the Indiana death sentence renders it constitutionally infirm under
the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
Review in the Indiana Supreme Court: The Need for a
Comparative Analysis between Factually Similar Cases
In its decision to uphold the validity of the death penalty in
Georgia, Florida, and Texas, the United States Supreme Court em-
phasized the appellate review procedures adopted by the courts of
those states."'2 In substance, however, each state adopted different
procedures.'" As noted earlier, the appellate procedures of Georgia
are far more comprehensive than its counterparts in Florida and
Texas.'u
Nevertheless, the supreme courts of Florida and Texas as-
sumed a similar role as the Georgia court. The Supreme Court
favorably noted that all three state courts have not hesitated to
vacate a death sentence when each court had independently deter-
mined that the sentence should not have been imposed." In each
state, the decision to vacate a death sentence is essentially derived
from a comparative analysis between cases to ensure that "the [ag-
gravating and mitigating] reasons present in one case will reach a
similar result to that reached under similar circumstances in an-
other case.""' With the adoption of these procedures the Court con-
130. Id. §§ (e)(1), (2).
131. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
132. See notes 77-105 supra and accompanying text.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See notes 95-103 supra and accompanying text.
136. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 253.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 [1981], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol15/iss2/8
INDIANA DEATH PENALTY
cluded that all three states provide meaningful appellate review of
each death sentence imposed.
Previous case law and the Indiana death penalty statute do not
state exactly what procedures the Indiana Supreme Court has
adopted to ensure meaningful appellate review. The statute pro-
vides for two rather vague guarantees: automatic and expedient re-
view by the Indiana Supreme Court."7 With regard to case law, the
court has yet to decide the appropriateness of a death sentence im-
posed under the current statute. 1
This void in the statute and Indiana case law is significant.
Unlike Georgia, Indiana does not statutorily provide for an elabor-
ate and extensive information-gathering system upon which the
supreme court can base a rational comparison of factually similar
137. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(h), note 107 supra.
138. In State v. McCormick, - Ind. - , 397 N.E.2d 276 (1979), the court
held the application of subsection (b)(8) of the death penalty violated the due process
rights of the defendant. Significantly, this case involved an interlocutory appeal of the
trial court's dismissal of the state's request for the death penalty. The defendant had
neither been convicted of murder, nor had a death sentence been imposed.
The facts of the case are important. The defendant was indicted for murder and
incarcerated awaiting trial. While in jail, the defendant allegedly killed a fellow in-
mate. Based upon the stronger evidence available in the jail homicide, the state went
to trial requesting the death penalty alleging as an aggravating circumstance that:
"The defendant has committed another murder, at any time, regardless of whether he
has been convicted of that other murder." IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(b)(8). note 107 supra. A
majority of the supreme court affirmed the trial court's reasoning that this situation
violated the defendant's right to due process because it:
[Apllows the State to secure a conviction on a strong murder case, then seek
the death penalty by proving a weak case before a jury which is undeniably
prejudiced. This opens the door to death penalty recommendations upon a
level of proof lower than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. McCormick, - Ind. at - , 397 N.E.2d at 280.
Judge DeBruler, a staunch opponent of capital punishment in Indiana, dissented
because the situation did not amount to a violation of due process.
To rectify the Indiana situation, Senators Duvall and O'Bannon introduced S.B.
278 to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The bill proposed an amendment to the
Indiana death penalty to change subsection (b)(8) to read:
(b) The aggravating circumstances are as follows:
(8) The defendant has committed more than one (1) murder in a single course
of events, and was charged with at least two (2) of these murders in the
charging instrument. However, this aggravating circumstance shall be
dismissed if the defendant is not convicted of more than one (1) murder in
the trial.
This proposed amendment, however, never passed the committee. See INDIANA
JUDICIAL CENTER, LEGISLATIVE BULLETIN at 84 (1980).
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cases. Moreover, unlike Florida or Texas, the Indiana Supreme
Court has not on its own volition adopted procedures necessary to
develop a comparative analysis. Indeed, the present lack of Indiana
cases dealing with the current death statute prohibits the court, at
least in the immediate future, from developing any type of com-
parative analysis."3 9  Thus, although the statute provides for
automatic and expedient review, the Indiana legislature and the In-
diana Supreme Court have failed to develop a system that ensures
meaningful appellate review of each death sentence. Until such a
system is developed, the Indiana death penalty statute cannot pass
constitutional muster under the eighth and fourteenth amendments
as construed in Furman and its progeny.
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL AMOUNT OF DISCRETION IN THE
INDIANA PROSECUTOR: THE JACKSON DEFECT
Discretion is a phenomenon that permeates every level of the
criminal justice system.4 0 Every actor within the system, from the
arresting officer to the parole official, possesses some degree of
discretion that can be exercised in such a way as to ameliorate the
impact of law exerted upon a particular individual. Many actors ex-
ercise their discretionary powers in an informal and invisible man-
ner."' Officials at higher stages in the criminal justice system, such
as judges, exercise their discretionary powers in a highly formal,
139. It is possible, of course, that the Indiana Supreme Court is at this very
moment allowing death penalty cases to accumulate so that a system of comparative
analysis can be developed. At the time of this writing, there are at least five men on
death row at the Indiana State Prison in Michigan City, Indiana.
The last man to be sentenced to death was Stephen Judy on February 25, 1980;
see note 123 supra. Judy was put to death by electrocution in the early morning hours
of March 9, 1981.
Others on death row are Michael Daniels, sentenced August, 1979; James
Brewer, sentenced March 1, 1978; Larry Hicks, sentenced September 1, 1978; Donald
Norton, sentenced September 13, 1976; and James Bonds, sentenced February 24,
1977. Norton and Bonds were sentenced to death pursuant to IND. CODE § 35-13-4-1
(1973), which was held unconstitutional in French v. State, 266 Ind. 276, 362 N.E.2d 834
(1977). See also note 26 supra and accompanying text. Thus, it is unclear how final
disposition of their cases will be handled.
140. See generally W. GAYLIN, PARTIAL JUSTICE: A STUDY OF BIAS IN SENTENC-
ING (1974); GOLDSTEIN AND GOLDSTEIN, CRIME, LAW AND SOCIETY (1971); E. SCHUR,
RADICAL NON-INTERVENTION: RETHINKING THE DELINQUENCY PROBLEM (1973); J.
SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1975).
141. See, e.g., W. GAYLIN AND E. SCHUIR note 140 supra. For example, the deci-
sion by a police officer to arrest a juvenile is often based upon such variables as race,
the seriousness of the offense, the social position of the juvenile's parents, the ad-
ministrative inconvenience of procedures associated with arrest, etc.
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structured, and visible setting. Moreover, discretionary decisions
made by these higher level officials are often subject to appellate
review.'"
It is important for prosecuting attorneys to possess a certain
amount of controlled discretion. Properly exercised discretion can
only aid in the administration of justice. But when the possible im-
position of a death sentence is involved, all discretion must be struc-
tured and checked in order to prevent the arbitrary and capricious
application of the ultimate punishment. Moreover, as stressed in
Jackson,"8 statutory schemes involving the death penalty must be
structured to prevent unnecessary burdens upon a defendant's
fundamental rights.
In Furman v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court in-
validated death penalty statutes that permitted a judge or jury to
exercise unbridled sentencing discretion."" Except for the sentenc-
ing stage, Furman did not deal with the exertion of discretion at
any other level of the criminal justice system. As post-Furman
litigation implies however, it cannot be assumed that the Court will
tolerate the exercise of discretion of such magnitude as to have the
same effect as the sentencing discretion condemned in Furman."4 5
Indiana is rather unique in the procedures necessary for a pro-
secutor to seek the death penalty. The Indiana penal code provides
that a person convicted of murder "shall be imprisoned for a fixed
term of forty years, with no more than twenty years added for ag-
gravating circumstances or not more than ten years subtracted for
mitigating circumstances .. ,,1"6 However, a separate statute pro-
vides that the "state may seek a death sentence for murder by alleg-
ing, on a page separate from the rest of the charging instrument,
142. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-1-47-1 (1976).
143. 390 U.S. 570 (1968); see notes 6 supra and 149-77 infra and accompanying
text.
144. 408 U.S. 238; see notes 32-71 supra and accompanying text.
145. See Note, Legislative Response to Furman v. Georgia-Ohio Restores
the Death Penalty, 8 AKRON L. REV. 149 (1974); Note, Discretion and the Constitu-
tionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1690 (1974); see also
Wollan, The Death Penalty after Furman, 4 LoY. CHI. L.J. 339 (1973).
146. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-3 (Supp. 1980). The statute further provides for a fine
of not more than $10,000. Murder is defined as: "A person who: (1) knowingly or inten-
tionally kills another human being; or (2) kills another human being while committing
or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct,
kidnapping, rape, or robbery; commits murder, a felony." IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1 (Supp.
1980).
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the existence of at least one of the aggravating circumstances
listed . . , "7
In other words, for the death penalty to be an available
sentencing alternative the prosecutor must specifically request it.'"
Unless this procedure is strictly followed, death is not an available
sentencing option. It is at this statutory juncture that an Indiana
prosecutor possesses an unconstitutional amount of discretion. It is
also at this juncture that the Jackson defect exists without
restraint.
As stressed in Jackson, a defendant's right not to incriminate
himself and his right to a jury trial are fundamental guarantees.""
Neither Congress nor the states may needlessly burden or chill
these fundamental rights. Based upon this premise, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Jackson,"° held unconstitutional the death
penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act.' 5'
Under the Federal Kidnapping Act, a defendant could be
sentenced to death only if a jury recommended the death penalty.
Thus, a peculiar effect of the Act was that the death penalty was
not an available sentencing option if a defendant pleaded guilty or
waived his right to a jury trial. The Court concluded that:
[T~he inevitable effect of any such provision is, of course, to
discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to
plead guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment
right to demand a jury trial. If the provision had no other
purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional
rights by penalizing those who chose to exercise them, then
it would be patently unconstitutional....
Whatever might be said of Congress' objectives, they cannot
be pursued by means that needlessly chill the exercise of
basic constitutional rights .... [For] the evil in the federal
statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and
jury waivers but simply that it needlessly encourages
them.'52
147. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (a), note 107 supra (emphasis added).
148. For procedures incident to grand jury indictments or filing an informa-
tion, see IND. CODE §§ 35-1-15-1 to -23; 35-1-17-1 to -7; and 35-3.1-1-1 to -19 (Supp. 1980).
149. The fifth and sixth amendments are set out at notes 5 and 6 supra.
150. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
151. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1201, 62 Stat. 760.
152. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581-83 (emphasis in the original).
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Thus, the central issue in Jackson was not whether death would be
imposed, but rather the statutory scheme by which death is made an
available sentencing alternative.
The statutory scheme of the Indiana death penalty delegates to
the prosecutor complete control over the decision to seek or not to
seek a death sentence. He or she is motivated to exercise this power
for several reasons. But a peculiar effect of the statutory scheme is
that it allows an Indiana prosecutor to exert impermissible burdens
upon a defendant's fundamental rights similar to those condemned
in Jackson.
A frequent argument made in post-Furman death penalty
litigation was the allegation that discretion was impermissibly exer-
cised at every stage of the criminal justice system.' " It has been
asserted that a prosecutor has unfettered discretion to select those
whom he wished to prosecute for a capital crime instead of, for ex-
ample, manslaughter, and those with whom he wished to plea bar-
gain to a lesser offense than capital murder.1" The Court, however,
rejected this argument as it "seem[ed] to be in the final analysis an
indictment of our entire system of justice.""'
In essence, then, the Court held that it would allow the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion if it is based upon rational reasons,
rather than capriciousness or arbitrariness. Rational reasons to not
seek a death sentence are such factors as the offense alleged is not
sufficiently serious to warrant the imposition of death, or because
there exists an insufficiency of evidence available to convict for a
capital crime. " Thus, the implication is that the decision to seek the
death penalty cannot be based upon capriciousness or other imper-
missible reasons or, as in Jackson, in such a way as to place un-
necessary burdens upon a defendant's fundamental rights.
It seems only proper that an Indiana prosecutor has the discre-
tionary power to not seek a death sentence when the evidence is in-
sufficient to convict for a capital crime, or the offense is not suffi-
ciently serious to warrant the punishment of death. But it also
153. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 226.
154. Id. The impermissible discretion argument goes even further to condemn
the standardless and therefore arbitrary exercise of the executive power of the gover-
nor to pardon or commute death sentences. For the obvious reason that it is not rele-
vant to the present discussion, this part of the argument is not included in the text.
155. Gregg v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 226.
156. Id. at 225. See note 165 infra and accompanying text.
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seems essential under due process principles that this prosecutorial
discretion be structured, checked, and visible for judicial review.
As stated above, the statutory scheme of the Indiana death
penalty gives the prosecutor complete control over the decision to
seek a death sentence.157 The scheme permits the exercise of pro-
secutorial discretion in an unstructured, unchecked, and invisible
manner. The statute allows the prosecutor to utilize the threat of a
possible death sentence as an impermissible lever against a defend-
ant to encourage from him a waiver of his fifth amendment right not
to plead guilty and to deter him from exercising his sixth amend-
ment right to a jury trial. The statutory scheme therefore allows an
Indiana prosecutor to use the threat of death in precisely the same
manner condemned by the Court in Jackson.
It could be argued that Jackson condemned the provisions of a
statute whereas the present discussion deals with the prosecutorial
decision to utilize a statute. Although this is true, the distinction is
immaterial.
In the recent case of Lockett v. Ohio," the Supreme Court held
that the Ohio death penalty statute was not in accord with the
eighth and fourteenth amendments. The majority reasoned that the
Ohio statute too severely limited the category of relevant mitigating
circumstances to be considered and weighed against the statutorily
defined aggravating circumstances.159 Because this successful con-
stitutional challenge required reversal of the imposed death sen-
tence, the plurality found it unnecessary to consider further any
other arguments raised by the petitioner."
Justice Blackmun, however, found it necessary to discuss other
defects of the Ohio death penalty.'' In his opinion, the Ohio statu-
tory scheme contained a Jackson deficiency. Under Ohio procedure
the trial court has unfettered discretion to prevent the imposition of
a capital sentence if a defendant pleads guilty.'62 If the defendant
157. See notes 107, and 146-53 supra and accompanying text.
158. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
159. Id. at 609.
160. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 609 n.16.
161. Id. at 613 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Significantly, Justice Blackmun was
amongst the dissenters in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 405; Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. at 307; and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 363. Thus, it is un-
characteristic of him to candidly admit that "heretofore [he has] been unwilling to in-
terfere with the legislative judgment of the States in regard to capital-sentencing pro-
cedures .. " Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 615.
162. OHIo R. CRIM. PROC. 11(c)(3). To paraphrase Justice Blackmun:
The rule states that if the indictment contains one or more specifications
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pleads not guilty, the trial court does not have the same power to
preclude a death sentence. Significantly, the.trial court had only the
power to prevent a death sentence, and not that it was required to
prevent the imposition of a death sentence. Thus, the statute
operated as a lever to encourage guilty pleas. In Justice Blackmun's
view the availability of a lesser sentence if a defendant plead guilty
was an impermissible burden upon his right not to incriminate
himself and his right to a jury trial. These burdens on fundamental
rights cannot stand by virtue of Jackson.'
The Indiana statutory scheme in comparison to the Ohio
scheme reveals the same Jackson defect. An Indiana trial court,
with the consent of the prosecutor, has the power to dismiss the re-
quest for the death penalty. Indeed, an Indiana prosecutor has even
the greater power to not request the death penalty in the first
place. As in Ohio, such a dismissal, or the decision to not seek the
death penalty, absolutely precludes imposition of a death sentence.
Similarly, just as in Ohio, "[tihis disparity between a defendant's
prospects under the two sentencing alternatives is . . . too great to
survive under Jackson ... ""
Proponents of the death penalty could argue the above conten-
tions are based upon pure conjecture and speculation. In other
words, as three members of the Court stated in upholding the
Georgia death penalty against a similar attack:
[of aggravating circumstances], and a plea of guilty or no contest to the
charge [of aggravated murder with specifications] is accepted, the court
may dismiss the specifications and impose sentence [of life imprisonment]
accordingly, in the interests of justice. Such a dismissal of aggravating
specifications absolutely precludes imposition of the death penalty.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 618.
163. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 619. As stated, under Ohio pro-
cedure the trial court has only the power to preclude a death sentence. Thus, the court
could still impose death if it chose to not exercise its power. Nevertheless, it is this
power to which Blackmun objected.
164. 438 U.S. at 619. Ohio procedure is similar to Indiana in another important
respect. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A) (Baldwin 1980), provides: "Imposition of the
death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded, unless one or more of the [ag-
gravating circumstances] is specified in the indictment or count in the indictment .. "
Thus, an Ohio prosecutor has the same power as an Indiana prosecutor to preclude the
imposition of a death sentence by simply not specifying an aggravating circumstance in
the indictment.
However, an Ohio prosecutor's power in this respect is still somewhat more
limited than the power of an Indiana prosecutor. For example, if an Ohio defendant is
charged with felony murder, then the indictment necessarily includes the specification
of an aggravating circumstance. In Indiana, on the other hand, the prosecutor has the
power to charge felony murder and still decide not to request a death sentence. See
notes 166-77 infra and accompanying text.
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Absent facts to the contrary, it cannot be assumed that
prosecutors will be motivated in their charging decisions
by factors other than the strength of their case and the
likelihood that a jury would impose the death penalty if it
convicts. . . . [D]efendants will escape the death penalty
through prosecutorial charging decisions only because the
offense is insufficiently serious; or because the proof is in-
sufficiently strong. . . . Thus the prosecutor's charging
decisions are unlikely to have removed from the sample of
cases by the Georgia Supreme Court any which are truly
'similar.' If the cases really were 'similar' in relevant
respects, it is unlikely that prosecutors would fail to pros-
ecute them as capital cases; and [we are] unwilling to
assume the contrary.'"
Thus it is necessary to show that there are "facts to the contrary"
and that Indiana prosecutors are indeed motivated by factors other
than the seriousness of an offense or the insufficiency of the
evidence.
As indicated earlier, the statutory scheme of the Indiana death
penalty is unique. The only way that death can be an available
sentencing alternative is for the prosecutor to specifically request it
in the indictment or information.'" It is possible for two different
defendants in two different counties to commit almost identical of-
fenses; for example, murder during the perpetration of a robbery.
Under Indiana procedure, it is possible for both defendants to be
charged under identical criminal statutes;'67 and yet, based upon no
other reason than the charging decisions of the respective pros-
ecutors, one defendant could face a forty to sixty year prison
165. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 225 (White, J., Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist,
J., concurring). Justice White stated further:
Unless prosecutors are incompetent in their judgments, the standards by
which they decide whether to charge a capital felony will be the same as
those by which the jury will decide the questions of guilt and sentence....
This does not cause the system to be standardless any more than the jury's
decision to impose life imprisonment on a defendant whose crime is deemed
insufficiently serious or its decision to acquit someone who is probably guilty
but whose guilt is not established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
166. See notes 107 and 146-47 supra and accompanying text.
167. For murder, IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1 (1) (Supp. 1980); for felony murder, id.
at (2). See note 146 supra. The statute making robbery an offense is IND. CODE §
35-42-5-1 (Supp. 1980).
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sentence'" while the other faces death."6 9 Thus, the statutory scheme
in Indiana allows for the obviously arbitrary and capricious selection
of criminals against whom the death penalty is sought. Moreover,
the charging decision by the prosecutor is neither visible nor sub-
ject to appellate review.
These capricious and arbitrary characteristics of the Indiana
death penalty are even more evident when it occurs within the same
county; even more so when it occurs between co-defendants. There
are at least three cases on point currently before Indiana trial
courts.Y7 Although each case involves some of the same defendants,
all three cases are unrelated. Each case consists of indictments for
robbery, murder, felony murder, conspiracy to commit robbery, and
a separate request for the death penalty. In addition, the third case
involves the charge of criminal confinement.""
In each case the prosecutor has offered to dismiss the request
for the death penalty in exchange for a plea of guilty. 17' By dismissal
of the request, the prosecutor effectively precludes any possibility
that a death sentence would be inflicted upon any of the defendants
who complied with the prosecutor's conditions. Clearly, this pros-
ecutor is utilizing the threat of death to encourage from the defend-
ant a plea of guilty, and a waiver of his right to a trial. Neither the
lack of evidence, nor the non-serious nature of the offense is the
motivating factor behind the prosecutor's offer to plea bargain. The
Indiana statutory scheme condones this practice although it was un-
168. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-3 (Supp. 1980). See note 146 supra and accompanying
text.
169. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9, note 107 supra.
170. State v. Larry Williams, DeWayne Schuh, Larry Perkins, and George
Redman, SCR 79-32 (Marshall County Super. Ct., Ind., filed May 15, 1979) (change of
venue granted), now S-79-53 (Fulton County Cir. Ct., Ind.); State v. Larry Williams and
Larry Perkins, SCR 80-9 (Marshall County Super. Ct., Ind., filed Feb. 4, 1980) (change
of venue granted), pending for docket number in LaPorte County Circuit Court; State
v. Larry Perkins, George Redman, and Pat Williams, SCR 80-11 (Marshall County
Super. Ct., Ind., filed Feb. 6, 1980) (change of venue granted), now Cause No. 6461
(Starke County Cir. Ct., Ind.).
171. For murder, see IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1(1) (Supp. 1980). In addition, felony
murder is a separate charge in the several indictments. See id. at (2). See also note 146
supra.
For the crime of robbery, see IND. CODE § 35-42-5-1 (Supp. 1980); for criminal
confinement, see IND. CODE § 35-42-3-3 (Supp. 1980).
172. Interview with Jere L. Humphrey, counsel for defendants Larry Williams
and Pat Williams, in Plymouth, Indiana (December 1, 1979 and March 10, 1980). See
also File, Deposition of Larry Perkins, at 23 (Jan. 26, 1980), State v. Williams, Cause
No. S-79-53 (Fulton County Cir. Ct., Ind.).
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equivocally condemned in United States v. Jackson, and emphatical-
ly reasserted by Justice Blackmun in Lockett v. Ohio. 7'
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion has another important
effect. By exercising his discretion in this manner, the prosecutor
removes factually similar cases from the sample of cases that may
eventually reach the Indiana Supreme Court for a comparative
analysis. For example, the only defendant charged with all three
felony murders has entered a plea agreement with the prosecutor.'74
The agreement is that in exchange for a guilty plea in each of the
three felony murders, the prosecutor will dismiss the request for
the death penalty and recommend concurrent sentences of fifty-four
years. 7' In addition, this particular defendant is to testify against
his co-defendants.' Thus, this defendant, who will have plead guilty
to three separate felony murders, will serve a term of years while
one of his co-defendants, who is charged with only one felony
murder, faces a possible death sentence. 7 Obviously, the Indiana
Supreme Court is effectively precluded from comparing these fac-
tually similar cases. Moreover, the court could possibly affirm a
sentence of death imposed upon an individual who is even less
dangerous to society than his principle accuser: a man who remains
alive and who will eventually be eligible for parole. Such disparity in
the application of the death sentence violates every concept of due
process that has yet been advanced by the Supreme Court since
Jackson and Furman.
Clearly, the Indiana death penalty contains serious constitu-
tional deficiencies. Until the legislature eliminates these defects in
the statutory scheme, the death penalty in Indiana will continue to
be applied arbitrarily, capriciously, and in such a way as to need-
lessly burden a defendant's fundamental rights guaranteed by the
fifth and sixth amendments. The Indiana death penalty therefore
173. See notes 149-64 supra and accompanying text.
174. See note 168 supra; File, Deposition of Larry Perkins, supra note 172, at
6-23. Larry Perkins pleaded guilty in S-79-53 in January of 1980. The Marshall County
prosecutor is presently making arrangements for Perkins to plead guilty in SCR 80-9
(now pending before LaPorte Circuit Court) and Cause No. 6461 in Starke Circuit
Court.
175. Id.
176. Id.; Interview with Jere L. Humphrey, counsel for defendants Larry
Williams and Pat Williams, in Plymouth, Indiana (March 10, 1980).
177. Id. Further, Larry and Pat Williams are brothers. The charges they face
are wholly unrelated to each other. In no case are Larry and Pat Williams co-
defendants. See note 170 supra. Moreover, Pat Williams is allegedly involved with only
one murder whereas Larry Perkins is a defendant in all three. Id.
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violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments. The statutory
scheme, however, is not beyond repair.
RECOMMENDATIONS
There are three basic recommendations for the elimination of
the constitutional deficiencies in the Indiana death penalty. Each
recommendation is related to the other two, but each still contains
its own distinct course of action and political ramifications.
Popular Referendum
The first and most obvious procedure by which to cure the con-
stitutional deficiencies of the death penalty is for the Indiana
Supreme Court to hold the penalty unconstitutional per se. Abolish-
ment by judicial fiat would obviously eliminate the present ar-
bitrary and capricious application of the ultimate punishment.
Guided by the federal constitution, the United States Supreme
Court held that death is not per se an unconstitutional punish-
ment."8 For Indiana's highest court to hold to the contrary, it would
have to rely upon other controlling authority. That authority is
found in a clause of the Indiana Constitution which provides that
"[t]he penal code shall be founded on the principles of reformation,
and not of vindictive justice."'7 9
In recent years only one Indiana case has dealt directly with
this issue. In Adams v. State,8 ' a bare majority of the Indiana
Supreme Court found shelter in the doctrine of stare decisis and
held that the death penalty is not vindictive, but is simply even-
handed justice. In excellent concurring and dissenting opinions,
Judges DeBruler and Prentice point out the illogical aspects of the
arguments relied upon by the majority. 8 ' Nevertheless, in light of
178. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 187.
179. IND. CONST. art. I, § 18. See also IND. CONST. art. I § 16 (prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment).
180. 259 Ind. 64, 271 N.E.2d 425 (1971), rev'd upon rehearing, 259 Ind. 164, 284
N.E.2d 757 (1972).
181. Id. at 74, 271 N.E.2d at 431 (DeBruler, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); id. at 97, 271 N.E.2d at 443 (Prentice, J., dissenting). It is beyond the
scope of the text to further analyze Adams. However, a synopsis and short excerpts
from Adams are insightful.
The three judge majority in Adams derived the notion of "even-handed justice"
from the cases of Rice v. State, 7 Ind. 332 (1855), and Driskill v. State, 7 Ind. 338
(1855). In an attempt to find contemporary authority supporting the notion of "even-
handed justice," the majority also cited McCutcheon v. State, 199 Ind. 247, 155 N.E.
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Furman and upon a petition to rehear, the court unanimously
reversed itself and held the Indiana death sentence incompatible
with the federal constitution.182 Furthermore, it would seem that
since the court reversed itself, Adams was never controlling author-
ity on the issue of whether the death penalty is compatible with the
Indiana Constitution.
It is recommended that the Indiana Supreme Court should rule
that the death penalty is simply antithetical with the state constitu-
tion. The court should not again try to rationalize the death penalty
544 (1927). But as the dissent points out, McCutcheon did not involve capital punish-
ment and therefore anything stated was merely dicta and not controlling.
The dissent further emphasizes that the majority misplaced its reliance upon
Driskill and Rice. Those cases even admit that capital punishment does not serve the
"principles of reformation" as required by the constitution. The reasoning in Driskill is
simply that capital punishment is not vindictive since its goal is the protection of soci-
ety. Driskill therefore supports Judge DeBruler's point that imprisonment serves the
same purpose and thus nothing is lost if the death penalty is abolished by judicial fiat.
But to return to the majority's emphasis, Judge DeBruler analyzes the notion of
even-handed justice most cogently:
It might mean that the death penalty is not vindictive because it is the
taking of the life of the offender who has himself taken a life. This would
be the same as claiming that the 'eye for an eye' philosophy is not vindic-
tive, when in fact it is the epitome of vindictiveness and revengefulness.
The exclusive use of the 'eye for an eye' philosophy is precisely what is
precluded by § 18. Whatever it might have meant to the judge who wrote
it, this statement that the death penalty is even-handed justice is not an
argument at all....
Id. at 76, 271 N.E.2d at 432.
Judge Prentice joined in the rejection of the majority's reliance upon illogical
precedent by stating:
Whatever may have been the circumstances in 1855 motivating us to the
decisions reached in Rice and Driskill, it is clear that we should not be
governed by such mish-mash .... There are many things in law that are
so because we say they are so, but there are limits. Death, as punishment
for a crime, any crime, cannot be other than vindictive, whatever may be
the meaning of 'even-handed justice.' There can be no basis for denying
that the death penalty offends against Article 1, § 18, except by reliance
upon these cases as precedent, and they are ... built on a foundation that
did not exist. The doctrine of stare decisis itself compels us to abandon it
when it does not serve the objectives of sense and justice.
Id. at 99, 271 N.E.2d at 444.
In sum, both dissenters agree that "section 18 [of the Indiana Constitution]
merely precludes a penalty which forecloses all possibility of reformation of the of-
fender." Id. at 77, 271 N.E.2d at 432 (DeBruler, J., dissenting) (emphasis in the
original). The majority opinion does not, in its own words, refute or answer this argu-
ment. Indeed, as long as Section 18 is part of the Indiana Bill of Rights, one simply
cannot distort logic to such a degree as to rationalize otherwise.
182. Adams v. State, 259 Ind. 164, 284 N.E.2d 757 (1972).
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in the face of the unambiguous constitutional mandate that "[tihe
penal code shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not
of vindictive justice."1 By trying to be logical in light of such a
clear constitutional provision, the court places itself in the untenable
position of wreaking havoc to the notion of sound legal analysis as
guided by constitutional principles. Surely, the present court should
at all costs avoid such a legacy.
"The highest judicial duty is to recognize the limits on judicial
power and to permit the democratic processes to deal with matters
falling outside of those limits."'" By holding the death penalty in-
valid under the Indiana Constitution, the supreme court would
breathe new life into the democratic processes of Indiana. If the
people of Indiana truly want capital punishment, then they should
say so through the ratification process of a constitutional amend-
ment.lu Other states have followed this road;'"6 Indiana should do
183. IND. CONST. art. I, § 18.
184. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 405 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
185. See IND. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (as amended in 1966), for the procedures to
be followed to amend the constitution. A possible amendment to Article 1, § 18 could
be simply: "This section does not apply to capital punishment."
In 1965, the Indiana General Assembly voted to abolish capital punishment, and
in its place make the punishment life imprisonment without eligibility for parole. The
vote in the state senate was 35 to 4; the vote in the Indiana House of Representatives
was 75 to 18. Governor Branigen, however, vetoed the act and stated:
I return herewith, without approval, House Enrolled Act No. 1054. In my
heart, I am opposed to the taking of the life of another. But, as Governor,
I cannot, in good conscience, take the easy course of signing away this
awful penalty unless it is the clear mandate of the people. They must
have the opportunity, in an election where this is an issue, to determine
whether the penalty, which we have had in our law since statehood, shall
no longer be. Until the issue is decided no man's life should be taken.
Veto Message of Governor Branigen, quoted in Adams v. State, 259 Ind. at 89, 271
N.E.2d at 438 (DeBruler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added).
186. See, e.g., Note, The New Illinois Death Penalty: Double Constitutional
Trouble, 5 Loy. CH. L.J. 351 (1974). The Illinois Constitution has a provision that is
substantively similar to Indiana's. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11, provides: "All penalties shall
be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective
of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. ... In light of this mandate, many
legislators and the governor had trouble with the enactment of new death penalty
legislation after Furman. However, a popular referendum was held and capital punish-
ment was endorsed at a margin of 2 to 1. Id.
The California Supreme Court construed the death penalty under the state con-
stitution as cruel and unusual punishment in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493
P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cerL denied, 405 U.S. 983 (1972). Subsequently, the public
amended the state constitution to simply read that capital punishment is not cruel or
unusual. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27.
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the same. Only then can it be a safe premise of the criminal justice
system that there does exist a clear mandate from the people that
death, in rare instances, is a permissible punishment.
Meaningful Appellate Review
Procedures Developed by the Supreme Court. The Indiana
Supreme Court can correct in one of two ways the constitutional
deficiencies of the current appellate review procedures governing
death sentences. First, the court could simply devise its own com-
prehensive procedures aimed at ensuring meaningful appellate
review.
This would necessarily involve two areas of concern. The court
must develop procedures requiring the trial court to make an ac-
curate record and transcript of the decision-making process involved
in imposing a sentence of death. As in Florida,18 this could involve
the adoption of rules requiring the sentencing authority to submit
into the record a written justification for the decision to impose
death. Or, as in Texas,' the court could require the judge or jury to
answer several specific questions concerning the elements of the of-
fense and the characteristics of the offender. In addition, the court
should require the trial judge to answer a questionnaire in every
capital case, regardless of whether or not a death sentence was im-
posed.
Obviously, there is a wide array of procedures that the court
could require to ensure an accurate record at the trial level. How-
ever, since this is a two-step process the court must also adopt for
itself rules and procedures to facilitate its own review of capital
cases.
As in Florida, Georgia, and Texas, the Indiana Supreme Court
should develop some sort of an analysis which compares factually
similar cases. The goal of this comparative analysis is to ensure that
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances present in one case
will result in the imposition of a sentence comparable to that im-
posed in a factually similar case. How this is achieved can only be
resolved by the court. But, again, it seems essential that the court
have available for its review the sentencing decisions of all capital
cases, regardless of whether or not death is actually imposed. Only
187. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
188. See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
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then can the supreme court analyze different sentences imposed in
factually similar cases.
Legislative Action. The above recommendation that the In-
diana Supreme Court develop the procedures necessary to ensure
meaningful appellate review contains the inherent danger that the
court would in essence assume a legislative function. Therefore, to
effectively avoid this problem the court should simply rule under
the eighth and fourteenth amendments that the Indiana death penalty
statute is unconstitutional because it fails to provide for meaningful
appellate review. This course of action would result in returning to
the legislature the proper responsibility of devising the procedures
and allocating the resources. necessary to develop a system of mean-
ingful appellate review of capital cases.
The legislature should develop a comprehensive information-
gathering system comparable to that employed in Georgia. 89 More-
over, the legislature should provide for additional supreme court
staff members whose sole function is to compile capital cases and
derive from the records the relevant information.'" In addition, it is
recommended that the legislature enact special provisions that re-
quire all capital cases to be sent to the Indiana Supreme Court,
regardless of whether or not a death sentence was imposed. This
would necessarily include cases in which guilt is ascertained by a
plea agreement between the defendant and the prosecutor.
This extra safeguard ensures that the supreme court will have
available for comparison all cases in which a death sentence had
been onsidered, and not simply the cases in which a death sentence
was imposed. As stated earlier, without such a provision the court
would be unable to compare and analyze different sentences im-
posed in factually similar cases."" This legislative safeguard seems
essential to ensure meaningful appellate review, yet is a require-
ment not even provided in Florida, Texas, and Georgia.
189. See notes 89-96 supra and accompanying text.
190. This recommendation would, of course, necessitate additional funding. To
acquire the funds it is suggested that the Indiana legislature should eliminate the of-
ficial reporter of the Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana Court of Appeals. As
every lawyer and law student knows, the official reporter is so inferior to the up-to-
date National Reporter System published by West, that the former is never used. It
should therefore be eliminated.
191. See notes 134-35 supra and accompanying text.
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Prosecutorial Discretion and a Cure of the Jackson Defect
As can be discerned from the previous discussion of the
Jackson defect,'92 there is no such thing in Indiana as a pure capital
case. What makes murder in Indiana a capital offense is not the
crime itself, but rather the decision of the prosecutor to seek the
death penalty. It is at this stage of prosecutorial decision-making
that occur the serious ramifications associated with the Jackson
defect. Since prosecutorial discretion and the consequential effects of
the Jackson deficiency are the very foundation of the statutory
scheme, no judicial construction of the statute can save the death
penalty.' Thus, the Jackson defect can only be eliminated by the
supreme court's total invalidation of the Indiana death penalty.
Therefore, it is recommended that the Indiana legislature re-
define the penalties for murder. In this regard, significant lessons
can be learned from the experiences of other states and the federal
government.
Guidance can be derived from the United States Supreme
Court in the Jackson case itself. In that case, the Court by way of
dicta suggested that Congress could eliminate the Jackson defect by
following the example of some of the states in which "the choice be-
tween life imprisonment and capital punishment is left to a jury in
every case-regardless of how the defendant's guilt has been deter-
mined."'"
Guidance can also be found in post-Furman death penalty litiga-
tion. Except for Justice Blackmun's treatment of the problem in
Lockett v. Ohio,'95 none of the other death penalty cases considered
the existence of a Jackson defect because it did not exist.
Except for Ohio, in all of the states involved with death penalty
litigation, murder was defined as a capital crime.' That is, if a per-
son committed murder, the available sentencing options included a
term of imprisonment or a death sentence. The decision to seek the
192. See notes 139-76 supra and accompanying text.
193. In United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, the Court held that the death
penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act could be judicially severed from the
remainder of the statute. Therefore, the defendant in Jackson could still stand trial
under the Act. However, the Indiana death penalty is a separate act and is not part of
any criminal statute. Thus, it cannot be severed.
194. 390 U.S. at 582 (emphasis in the original).
195. 438 U.S. at 613.
196. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
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death penalty in those states was therefore not delegated to the
prosecutor; the legislature had already made the decision. Thus, the
prosecutors of those states could not utilize the death penalty in the
manner condemned by Jackson and currently practiced in Indiana.
Examples can also be derived from neighboring states. In Il-
linois, the death penalty statutory scheme provides that "[iun any
case in which the defendant is convicted of murder, the state shall
seek imposition of the death penalty in all cases where any of the
[aggravating] circumstances obtain. . . ."' One can clearly see the
potential in Indiana for prosecutorial abuse by comparing the Illinois
statutory scheme with the Indiana provision that "[tihe state may
seek a death sentence ... "198
More to the point, the Kentucky experience is an excellent ex-
ample of how the Indiana legislature could correct the deficiencies in
the current death penalty statute. From 1975 until 1978, Kentucky
had a statutory scheme almost identical to that of Indiana. The rele-
vant Kentucky statute provided that "[m]urder is a Class A felony,
except that in the following situtions it is a capital offense. ... "
Those situations that made murder a capital offense were simply a
list of the generally accepted aggravating circumstances.'
To analogize, both Indiana and Kentucky defined murder as a
felony punishable by imprisonment. The only way for murder to be
designated a capital offense in either state was for the respective
prosecutors to take further procedural steps to seek a death pen-
197. 1973 Ill. Laws, Pub. Act 78-921 (emphasis added). The statute was subse-
quently held unconstitutional in People ex rel. Rice v. Cunningham, 61 Ill. 2d 353, 336
N.E.2d 1 (1975). The statute was invalidated because it provided for appellate review
of a death sentence by a three judge panel. This appellate review provision con-
tradicted an Illinois constitutional mandate that required all death sentences to be
reviewed by the state supreme court.
The death penalty was subsequently repealed by 1977 Il1. Laws, Pub. Act 80-26
§ 3 (effective June 21, 1977). Except for the three judge review provision, the death
penalty was re-enacted in all relevant respects and can now be found at ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
198. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(a), note 107 supra (emphasis added). But see a most
blatant Jackson defect in the Connecticut death penalty statute which provides: "Such
hearing [to determine whether death is to be imposed] shall not be held if the state
stipulates that none of the aggravating factors set forth ... exists or that one or more
of the mitigating factors set forth . .. exists." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46 (West
Supp. 1980).
199. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020(2) (Baldwin 1975).
200. Id. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9, note 107 supra, for a general idea of
the Kentucky aggravating circumstances.
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alty. The statutory scheme of both states thus provides the same
juncture at which impermissible prosecutorial discretion can be ex-
ercised.
The Indiana scheme allows prosecutorial discretion to be exer-
cised in this manner. But the Kentucky scheme went so far as to
specifically endorse it by providing: "However, any crime classified
as a capital offense may at the discretion of the state be prosecuted
as a Class A felony. . ."' It is clear, then, that both the Indiana
and Kentucky death penalty schemes contained the same Jackson
defect.
Kentucky, however, has eliminated the constitutional deficien-
cies in its death penalty. In 1978, amendments were made to the
above quoted portions of the Kentucky statute. The first part of the
scheme which designated murder as a felony, except that upon the
occurrence of an aggravating circumstance it was a capital offense,
was amended to read: "Murder is a capital offense."' 2 This simple
amendment thus made death an available sentencing option for all
convictions of murder.
Accordingly, the second part of the Kentucky statute that en-
dorsed prosecutorial discretion was eliminated. That portion of the
statute now reads: "When a person is convicted of a capital offense
he shall have his punishment fixed at death or imprisonment. . .. ,
Thus, a Kentucky prosecutor neither needs to make a separate
charging decision, nor must he take any procedural steps to make
death a sentencing option; the Kentucky legislature already made
that decision. Kentucky therefore corrected the Jackson defect and
eliminated its potential for prosecutorial abuse.
The Indiana legislature must make the same amendments to the
statutory scheme of the death penalty. By legislatively providing
201. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.030(1) (Baldwin 1975). The pertinent part of the
Kentucky statute just quoted in the text ends with the phrase: "provided such election
to so prosecute [as a Class A felony instead of a capital felony] is made at the time of
the indictment." Id.
Thus, the discretion of a Kentucky prosecutor is even more controlled than an
Indiana prosecutor because for the former, death is already an available sentencing
alternative. The Kentucky prosecutor must take affirmative procedural steps to
preclude death as punishment. The Indiana prosecutor must initially take procedural
action to ensure that death is available as a punishment. Moreover, in Kentucky, the
prosecutor must make his charging decision "at the time of the indictment." Id. Thus,
he or she cannot use the death penalty as an impermissible lever like his or her
counterpart does in Indiana.
202. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020(2) (Baldwin 1978).
203. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.030(1) (Baldwin 1978).
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death as a possible punishment for all convictions of murder, the
decision is taken away from the prosecutor. Although the prosecutor
is stripped of some power, he is also stripped of the opportunity to
abuse that power. The end result, then, will be a constitutionally
tolerable death penalty statute in Indiana. Until this reform is made,
along with procedures to ensure meaningful appellate review, In-
diana will continue to arbitrarily and capriciously select those
against whom is inflicted the ultimate penal sanction.
CONCLUSION
All of the major death penalty cases have been decided by the
United States Supreme Court in only the last thirteen years. These
cases reveal a significant evolution of constitutional thought. But the
decisions themselves are based upon differing constitutional
theories.
By compiling the theories and comparing the Court's various
decisions, one is able to discern a specific and cohesive constitutional
analysis of capital punishment. This analysis reveals that the states
may inflict death as a penal sanction only if the relevant statutory
schemes fulfill basic constitutional requirements. These re-
quirements are in turn derived from the various constitutional
theories relied upon by the Court. A state that fulfills the re-
quirements and invokes the proper theories will achieve a constitu-
tionally tolerable death penalty statute.
There are three basic theories and requirements to be met in
order to develop a valid death penalty. Under a penumbra of fun-
damental rights theory, a state must first structure its statutory
scheme to preVent the exertion of impermissible burdens upon a de-
fendant's fifth amendment right to not plead guilty, and his sixth
amendment right to a jury trial. Secondly, to avoid the cruel and
unusual punishment prohibition of the eighth amendment, the
sentencing authority must be directed by statutory guidelines that
focus on the particular nature of the offense and the specific charac-
teristics of the defendant. Finally, the statute and the state judiciary
must provide meaningful appellate review to ensure strict com-
pliance with the first two requirements* Meaningful appellate
review is essential to avoid violation of due process under the four-
teenth amendment.
Utilizing this three-prong approach, an examination of the In-
diana death penalty discloses significant defects. First, the statutory
scheme and the Indiana judiciary have failed to provide a system
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that ensures meaningful appellate review. This legislative and judi-
cial shortcoming occurs at two levels: the trial court and the Indiana
Supreme Court. The end result, then, is the promulgation of a
decision-making system of inflicting death that provides "no mean-
ingful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death
penalty) is imposed from the many cases in which it is not."'
This lack of meaningful appellate review can be remedied in
one of two ways, but the impetus must come from the Indiana
Supreme Court. First, the court could on its own volition develop
procedures requiring Indiana trial courts to make an accurate re-
cord and transcript of the decision-making process involved in im-
posing a sentence of death. Furthermore, the court must develop a
comparative analysis which ensures that similar sentences are im-
posed in factually similar cases. This necessarily requires the court
to compare murder convictions in which a prison sentence was im-
posed with murder convictions in which death was imposed. And
this obviously includes convictions based upon plea agreements.
The second way the Indiana Supreme Court could rectify the
situation is to hold the Indiana death penalty unconstitutional for its
failure to provide meaningful appellate review. This would result in
returning to the legislature the proper responsibility of devising the
procedures and allocating the resources necessary to develop a
system of meaningful appellate review of capital cases.
The second and most significant deficiency of the death penalty
is the power it grants to an Indiana prosecutor: the Jackson defect.
Death is not an available sentencing option unless the prosecutor
specifically requests it. It is at this statutory juncture that the pros-
ecutor possesses an unconstitutional amount of power. The statute
permits the prosecutor to use the threat of a possible death
sentence to encourage from a defendant a plea of guilty, and a
waiver of his right to a jury trial. Thus, the Indiana statutory
scheme condones the exertion of needless burdens upon a
defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights. This practice is con-
stitutionally intolerable, "[f]or the evil in the . . . statute is not that
it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply that
it needlessly encourages them.""5
The Jackson defect can only be eliminated by re-defining the
penalties for murder. The legislature must provide death as an
204. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
205. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583 (emphasis in the original).
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available sentencing option for all convictions of murder. Stripping
from the prosecutor the power to decide whether or not to seek a
death sentence also precludes him or her from exerting impermissi-
ble burdens upon a defendant's fundamental rights. By holding the
statutory scheme in violation of this penumbra of fundamental
rights theory, the Indiana Supreme Court will fulfill its role as guard-
ian of the constitution.
The premise of this note has been that the Indiana death pen-
alty is far from a constitutionally valid statute. The moral and
ethical issues of capital punishment have been painfully avoided; for
the resolution of those questions can only be found within each of us
and under our own guiding principles. The political entity known as
the State of Indiana, however, has its own guiding principles in the
form of the state and federal constitutions. And as Patrick Henry
said in support of the adoption of one of those guiding principles:
"But when we come to punishments, no latitude ought to be left, nor
dependence put on the virtue of representatives. . . .You let them
loose; you do more - you depart from the genius of your country ....,206
E. Nelson Chipman, Jr.
206. 3 J. ELLIOT'S DEBATES 447 (2d ed. 1876) (arguing for ratification of the
eighth amendment in particular, and the Bill of Rights in general, at the Virginia Con-
stitutional Convention).
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